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LAW, LAWYERS, AND SELF-
GOVERNANCE DURING THE HEYDAY 
OF THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE 
W. MARK C. WEIDEMAIER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION
During the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, the London Stock
Exchange (LSE) was arguably the most important economic institution in the 
capitalist world.1 Together with other major stock exchanges, it directed 
enormous flows of capital from investors in rich nations to firms and governments 
around the globe. By the First World War, nearly one-third of all securities, 
whether issued by public or private entities, were listed on the LSE.2 Like other 
exchanges, the LSE also was self-governing.3 Its membership criteria determined
who could trade, its rules and regulations determined the form of transactions,
and its governing committees or private arbitrators—not the courts—resolved 
disputes among members. The LSE enforced its rules and decisions not by legal 
coercion, but extralegally, by suspending or expelling members who refused to
comply. 
In these ways, the LSE resembled other merchant communities that enforce
agreements in accordance with specialized rules and through extralegal rather 
than legal sanctions. Private legal systems of this sort have attracted much 
academic attention, resulting in a large and interdisciplinary literature in law,
economics, history, sociology, anthropology, and beyond.4 This literature has 
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1. Larry Neal & Lance Davis, The Evolution of the Structure and Performance of the London Stock
Exchange in the First Global Financial Market, 1812–1914, 10 EUR. REV. OF HIST. 279, 279–80 (2006). 
2. Id. at 280. 
3. Marc Flandreau, Sovereign States, Bondholders Committees, and the London Stock Exchange in 
the Nineteenth Century (1827–68): New Facts and Old Fictions, 29 OXFORD REV. ECON. POLICY 676
(2013), https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/29/4/668/481954 [https://perma.cc/JRN2-EV9V] (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2019); Larry Neal & Lance Davis, The Evolution of the Rules and Regulations of the First 
Emerging Markets: The London, New York and Paris Stock Exchanges, 1792–1914, 45 Q. REV. OF ECON.
& FIN. 297 (2005), https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1062976905000189 [https://perma.cc/ 
5PXH-9JHJ] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
4. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991); AVNER GRIEF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS
FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (2006); BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE (2017); Lisa Bernstein,
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196 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:195
produced important insights about how private legal systems operate and why 
some economic communities opt for private over public enforcement. Perhaps 
the most fundamental insight is that, in some transactional settings, contracts are 
more secure when enforced extralegally.5 
The LSE is a straightforward example of this benefit. LSE members engaged 
in transactions, such as time bargains and options,6 that English law deemed
unenforceable or outright prohibited.7 Until 1860, Barnard’s Act outlawed 
forward transactions unless the seller retained the shares until closing.8 The 
Gaming Act of 1845 declared contracts “by way of gaming and wagering” null 
and void,9 and Leeman’s Act of 1867 invalidated contracts speculating in bank 
shares.10 These and other laws meant that LSE members could not rely on the
English courts to enforce many contracts. By resolving disputes privately, and 
threatening non-compliant members with expulsion, the LSE assured that
members would honor bargains. 
However, the LSE does not merely illustrate a private legal system in action. 
Examination of its practices also reveals a gap in the literature and helps to fill it. 
Studies of private legal systems generally examine how members enforce
bargains and thus focus attention on exclusion and other extralegal mechanisms. 
Law and legal actors recede into the background. Yet a rather different picture
emerges if we shift our attention away from the problem of “enforcing
agreements in exchange”11 and toward sources of friction between the private 
legal system and the state itself. A community that aspires to self-governance 
must do more than facilitate trade. In many cases, it will also have to navigate a 
constantly-shifting relationship with the state itself. 
Certainly this was true of the LSE. As economic historian Larry Neal has 
written: 
[T]he particular form of self-regulation of the London Stock Exchange was shaped by 
the peculiarities of English common law and constrained ultimately by statute and the
ever-present threat of additional legislation. The influence of statute and judicial 
Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 115 (1992). 
5. See generally Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2342–45 (2004). 
6. E. VICTOR MORGAN AND W. A. THOMAS, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE; ITS HISTORY
AND FUNCTIONS 20–21, 60 (1962). A time bargain is an agreement to sell securities in the future at a
specified price. Securities often did not change hands on the settlement date; instead, closing simply
involved payment of any difference between the contract and market price. Id. at 60. 
7. On English securities regulation through the mid-nineteenth century, see, e.g., STUART 
BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATIONS: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1600-
1860 88–122 (1998). 
8. RUDOLPH E. MELSHEIMER & WALTER LAURENCE, THE LAW AND CUSTOMS OF THE 
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE 20–21 (1879). 
9. MORGAN & THOMAS, supra note 6, at 147–48; MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 25. 
10. Flandreau, supra note 3, at 676; MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 25. 
11. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments, in
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 175–200 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley, eds., 
2008). 
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constraint . . . [led to] various responses by the members of the self-regulating London 
Stock Exchange . . . The relationship between formal regulation and informal 
regulation of the London Stock Exchange over time was therefore much more complex 
than simply reflecting a common law society governed by central government.12 
To put the point a bit differently, the LSE did much more than ensure that 
members would honor bargains. Much of its work was devoted to creating and 
maintaining room to operate with minimal state intrusion. This type of work was 
especially important, as financial crises repeatedly spawned interest in tightening
state regulation of securities transactions.13 Yet the problem of maintaining 
independence was not unique to the LSE; to a degree, it will occupy the attention 
of any self-governing community.14 
This Article draws on original archival research, including the minutes of LSE 
committee meetings and correspondence with solicitors, to examine how the LSE 
managed its relationship with English courts and common law in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.15 By studying that problem—rather 
than the problem of enforcing bargains—we can see the artificiality of any neat 
dichotomy between private and public legal systems.16 To keep English courts 
from disrupting its affairs, the LSE used both extralegal tools—for example, 
expelling members who filed prohibited lawsuits—and legal tools—such as 
monitoring judicial developments and funding litigation. Regardless of the nature 
of the tool, lawyers often shaped its response, and their advice was guided by 
explicitly legal concerns.17 
The LSE has attracted a great deal of academic study, often by economic 
historians.18 Some of the literature discusses the role of lawyers in LSE business 
12. Larry Neal, The Evolution of Self- and State Regulation of the London Stock Exchange, 1688– 
1878, in LAW AND LONG-TERM ECONOMIC CHANGE: A EURASIAN PERSPECTIVE 300, 302 (Debin Ma
& Jan Luiten van Zanden, eds., Stanford Univ. Press 2013). 
13. See BANNER, supra note 7, at 88 (stating that when “stock prices endured a period of sustained
decline, Parliament would again consider legislation designed to limit the perceived excesses of 
stockjobbers”). 
14. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Role of Lawyers in Removing Economic Activity from State
Supervision, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2019). 
15.  My focus on English courts and common law means that I do not address the separate question 
of how the LSE responded to the recurring threat of regulation by Parliament. On the history of English 
securities regulation, see, e.g., BANNER, supra note 7. 
16. Cf. Hadfield, supra note 11, at 200 (noting the “complexity and multiplicity” of institutions that 
support contracting); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous 
Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 18 n.25 (1981) (“Since indigenous systems frequently incorporate 
cultural elements from the official law and since their sanctioning systems are often entwined with the 
official ones, no dichotomous distinction can be made.”).
17. Throughout this Article, I refer to material found in the LSE archives at Guildhall Library in
London. I reference these sources with the citation format MS X/Y/Z, which includes the MS number of 
the relevant file or folder (X), the volume number (Y), and the page number or range (Z). Where 
available, I also include the date or date range of the relevant meeting minutes in parentheses after the 
citation. Digital files of all archival material referenced are on file with me. 
18. Primary histories include RANALD C. MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY
1 (1999); MORGAN & THOMAS, supra note 6, at 9.
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and disputes, but lawyers generally occupy a peripheral place in the story.19 And 
lawyers are almost entirely absent from the broader literature on private legal 
systems.20 This Article’s account brings lawyers to the fore, examining their role
in creating and maintaining space for the LSE to engage in self-governance. In 
practice, the LSE could not entirely prevent English courts from interpreting, 
applying, and deciding whether to respect its rules. To the contrary, courts
routinely heard lawsuits in which the litigants disputed the applicability or 
meaning of LSE rules and customs. A significant part of the work performed by
the LSE’s governing committees involved monitoring and responding to such 
legal developments. This Article thus provides a case study of how one self-
governing community created and worked to maintain the integrity of its rules in 
the face of repeated incursion by state legal actors.21 
Part II briefly situates this Article within the broader scholarship on private
legal systems. Part III describes the LSE’s operation and the benefits it derived
from private rule-making and adjudication. Part IV then examines the role of 
English law and courts, which the LSE viewed both as a potential source of 
default rules and as a constraint on its freedom of action. Part IV focuses on
interactions with solicitors. When asked to apply existing rules, or to promulgate 
new ones, the LSE’s governing committees frequently sought legal advice. The 
solicitors tended to be conservative and prioritized avoiding legal conflict over 
maximizing room for self-governance. Because the LSE generally deferred to this 
advice, the effect was to subtly constrain the reach of its private legal system.
19. For example, Davis, Neal, and White briefly discuss the role of lawyers in resolving the dispute 
between “optionist” and “constructionist” factions of the LSE. The dispute pitted established against 
younger members, like Jacob Ricardo, who favored trading in options. Lance Davis, Larry Neal & 
Eugene N. White, The Development of the Rules and Regulations of the London Stock Exchange, 1801– 
1914, 14–17 (Feb. 27, 2004), https://as.vanderbilt.edu/econ/sempapers/Neal.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XF4-
AA6E] (Unpublished seminar paper, Vanderbilt University). Michie’s foundational history of the LSE 
also discusses the role of lawyers in determining whether the LSE was required to admit women as 
members after Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919. MICHIE, supra note 18, at 201–02. 
20. Perhaps the most direct comparison is to the literature on the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA), at least some of which explores how ISDA interacts with national legal 
systems. See, e.g., Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of the Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211 (2001) (providing a pro-
ISDA perspective to its history and activities); Colin Scott & John Biggins, Public-Private Relations in a
Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: ISDA, The State and OTC Derivatives Market Reform, 13 EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 309, 323–29 (2012). 
21. This Article also serves as a mild corrective to scholarship that seems to draw neat distinctions
between public and private systems of governance. See, e.g., Edward Peter Stringham & Ivan Chen, The
Alternative of Private Regulation: The London Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market as a 
Model, 32 ECON. AFFAIRS 37, 37 (2012) (“To most people the choice is between government oversight 
and no oversight, and the latter sounds undesirable. What they overlook is oversight from the private 
sector, which historically was the norm.”). 
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II
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
This Article connects to an extensive literature examining the institutional 
structures that provide transactional assurance to parties who cannot or will not 
rely on public courts for enforcement.22 Others have ably reviewed this literature, 
and I will not repeat their work here.23 Nevertheless, some brief background will 
illustrate how this Article differs in its focus from much of the related scholarship. 
Parties to any transaction may ask state-funded courts to resolve disputes and 
can anticipate that other state actors will enforce the judgments of these courts. 
The literature on private legal systems takes as its subject merchant communities 
and other groups who opt out of this public legal regime. These parties instead 
resolve disputes outside of the public courts—often in arbitration24—in 
accordance with specialized rules, and ensure compliance by excluding non-
compliant parties from future transactions.25 Despite its richness and breadth, the 
literature on such private legal systems tends to focus on a limited set of inquiries. 
Perhaps the most central inquiry concerns why parties opt for private over 
public enforcement. In some cases, the answer is that parties lack access to
effective public courts, perhaps because a transaction is unlawful, or because they 
view public courts and judges as lacking power or competence.26 Yet even when 
effective public courts exist, private enforcement may offer efficiency gains.27 For 
example, private arbitration may yield cheaper, more accurate results, or might 
better protect parties who want confidentiality.28 More fundamentally, private 
enforcement mechanisms may provide greater incentives to honor agreements.
Disputes arising from small transactions, for instance, may not justify the time
and expense of litigation, but the threat of exclusion might still induce
22. Richman, supra note 5, at 2329. There is also related literature on self-regulation, which often
studies securities exchanges and other financial markets institutions. See, e.g., Paul Mahoney, The 
Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997); Saule Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate:
Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 412 (2011); Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2365 (1998). 
23. See e.g., RICHMAN, supra note 4. 
24. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Private Ordering and Commercial Arbitration: Lasting Lessons from 
Mentschikoff, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2019). 
25. There are other ways to provide transactional assurance, including vertical integration within a
firm. See Richman, supra note 5, at 2348–50. 
26. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional 
and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (2000); John McMillan & Christopher 
Woodruff, Private Ordering Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (1999–2000); 
Ariel Porat, Enforcing Contracts in Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The Close Relationship Between Public 
and Private Orders, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1999–2000). 
27. Richman, supra note 5, at 2336–37. 
28. See id. at 2341 (describing potential efficiency gains from private dispute resolution); see also
Bernstein, supra note 4, at 124–126 (discussing advantages of arbitration in protecting secrecy and in 
resolving common disputes in accordance with industry custom). Note that arbitration is private, but not 
necessarily confidential. The obligation to maintain confidentiality must come from a different source. 
See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1211 (2006). 
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200 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:195
compliance.29 Indeed, private enforcement may offer efficiency gains even for 
very large transactions. Exclusion and other reputational penalties deny 
breaching parties the opportunity to gain from future transactions.30 When these 
prospective gains are sufficiently large, exclusion imposes costs that may dwarf 
the expected gains from breach. Private legal systems are thus most likely to arise
in relatively close-knit communities, where members are repeat players who will 
view exclusion as a significant penalty.31 
The literature on private legal systems is defined by the close study of 
particular merchant communities and the mechanics by which these communities 
engender trust, often by reducing information asymmetries.32 For example, where
transactions require a high degree of trust—say, contracts for the sale of valuable
and easily-stolen goods like diamonds33—a system of arbitration can reveal 
credible information about the trustworthiness of prospective counter-parties.34 
Other mechanisms for enhancing trust include selective membership criteria and 
the dissemination of information about a member’s propensity to honor 
agreements.35 
As noted, however, the literature generally pays relatively little attention to 
the law and to lawyers. To be sure, law is not entirely absent from the picture. 
For example, Lisa Bernstein’s classic study of the diamond industry notes that, 
although the threat of expulsion generally assures that members comply with
industry arbitration awards, expelled members may have an incentive to 
challenge their expulsion in court.36 Even here, though, the law is a bit player.
Center stage is occupied by private actors using extralegal tools to enforce
bargains.
The LSE has been the object of similar close study, yielding rich accounts of 
its practices, the regulation of securities markets, and the role of political 
29. Richman, supra note 5, at 2343. 
30. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 124; Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in 
Mexican California, 13 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 202 (1997). 
31. See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Ordering Under Dysfunctional Public 
Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2422 (1999–2000) (“In close-knit communities, where people interact with 
each other frequently and information flows freely, people may adhere to social norms of cooperation
because it is in their long-term interest to do so.”).
 32. See Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi
Traders, 49 J. ECON. HISTORY. 857, 864–65 (1989) (discussing information asymmetries inherent in 
overseas business transactions through agents). 
33. See Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish
Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383, 394 (2006) (noting potential gains from
cheating and difficulties in ensuring cooperation). 
34.  Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through 
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745 (2001); Paul R. Milgram, Douglass C. North, 
& Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, 
and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 3 (1990); Richman, supra note 33, at 396–97. 
35. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1765. 
36. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 129. Bernstein also explains how industry rules discourage such
lawsuits by offering expelled members the opportunity for readmission (likely to be denied if the member 
files a lawsuit challenging the expulsion). The story highlights how law constrains the use of private 
enforcement tools, and how industry rules seek to minimize the constraint. 
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considerations in shaping English financial markets.37 Yet here, too, law and
lawyers play peripheral roles.38 A different story emerges if we shift the focus of 
inquiry, away from how the LSE enforced bargains, and towards questions about 
how it managed its relationship to English law and legal institutions. Public 
attitudes towards the LSE and its members shifted widely over time, as one might 
expect of an institution associated with recurring financial crises.39 Moreover, it 
proved impossible to completely privatize the process of resolving disputes 
arising from Exchange transactions. Thus, the LSE’s practices were frequently 
considered both before Parliament and before the English courts. Much of its 
internal work consisted of managing these interactions. 
III
THE LSE’S PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEM
Although its origins date to the mid-eighteenth century, the LSE formally
came into existence in 1801 as the Stock Subscription Room.40 From its inception,
the LSE separated ownership from operational control. The construction of the 
Exchange building was financed by issuing shares to the public. These
shareholder-proprietors controlled the building and set subscription fees to be
paid by members—from which the proprietors derived their income—but did not 
make membership decisions or otherwise dictate LSE practices.41 The
Committee of Trustees and Managers represented the proprietors’ interests, but 
its role was largely confined to matters related to the management of the 
building.42 The Committee for General Purposes (CfGP) represented the
members and conducted day-to-day operations of the Exchange. It established 
admissions criteria, admitted and expelled members, and wrote and enforced the 
rules governing Exchange transactions.43 
The CfGP delegated much of its work to sub-committees. For example, the 
Sub-Committee on Rules and Regulations wrote, interpreted, and revised rules
37. Seminal accounts of LSE practices and history include MICHIE, supra note 18, MORGAN &
THOMAS, supra note 6, and DAVID KYNASTON, THE CITY OF LONDON I-IV (1994-2001). On the history
of English securities regulation, see BANNER, supra note 7. For analysis of the intersection between 
politics and English financial markets, see, e.g., BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, CITY OF CAPITAL: POLITICS
AND MARKETS IN THE ENGLISH FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1996); Bruce G. Carruthers, Homo
Economicus and Homo Politicus: Non-Economic Rationality in the Early 18th Century London Stock 
Market, 37 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 165 (1994). 
38. See Davis, Neal & White, supra note 19. As noted, there are exceptions, although even here
lawyers are not the primary subject of interest. 
39. BANNER, supra note 7, at 88. 
40. MICHIE, supra note 18, at 15–36. 
41. Ranald C. Michie, The London and New York Stock Exchanges, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 171, 172–73
(1986); Larry Neal & Lance Davis, Why the London Stock Exchange Dominated the First Age of 
Globalization, 1801–1914, 11–12 (Oct. 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript). 
42. See Neal & Davis, supra note 1, at 283 (“The Trustee and Managers were responsible for
maintaining the building and setting the annual fees.”). 
43. See, e.g., MICHIE, supra note 18, at 173; Neal & Davis, supra note 1, at 282–84. In 1943, control 
was unified in the Council of the LSE. MICHIE, supra note 18, at 297. 
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202 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:195
governing the conduct of business on the Exchange. If a member challenged a 
sub-committee’s decision, or if the decision implicated a matter of significance to 
the broader membership, the CfGP’s review of that decision could be searching. 
In most cases, however, confirmation of sub-committee decisions by the CfGP
was pro-forma. 
Transactions in securities typically involved multiple contracts and multiple 
parties, only some of whom were LSE members. To take a simple example, a 
non-member customer might place an order to buy or sell securities through a 
broker, an LSE member. The broker might carry out these instructions by
transacting with a jobber, that is, a dealer, who made a market in the relevant
securities. Even such a simple transaction involved multiple contracts. The first
was between the broker and his customer.44 This contract, subject to the law of 
agency, obliged the customer to indemnify the broker for costs incurred in the
ordinary course of LSE business.45 The second contract, for the purchase and sale
of securities, was between the two members. If the selling member did not own
the securities, he would have to find someone who did, and this would create yet 
a third contract. In such a case, the process of settlement—described in more 
detail later46—would ultimately produce a contract between the two non-
members, in LSE parlance, the ultimate buyer and seller.47 
From the LSE’s perspective, the contract between members was the one that 
mattered. LSE rules required members to fulfill bargains “according to the rules, 
regulations, and usages of the Stock Exchange,” whether or not the transaction 
was permissible under English law and even if the transaction did not comport 
with the instructions given by the broker’s principal.48 As noted, many
contracts—such as forward contracts and options—were unenforceable under 
English law. The LSE not only enforced such contracts, it treated them as nearly
irrevocable.49 The CfGP could annul bargains, but its powers in this regard were
44. The LSE resisted admitting women as members until the 1970s. MICHIE, supra note 18, at 201– 
03, 483–84. 
45. MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 30. As the law developed, it became increasingly 
clear that English courts would impose this indemnity obligation even when the transaction involved a
forward contract or option. See generally RUDOLPH E. MELSHEIMER & SAMUEL GARDNER, THE LAW 
AND CUSTOMS OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 42–43 (1905) (describing cases in which the English courts
enforced the indemnity obligation). Moreover, even before the law had developed to this extent, there 
were contractual workarounds. For example, a broker might require the customer to post a bond for the 
amount that might be owed on an option contract, and there were judicial decisions allowing brokers to
recover against the bond despite the speculative nature of the underlying transaction. See MORGAN &
THOMAS, supra note 6, at 63. 
46. See infra Part IV.A.1.
 47. See MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 83. 
48. Id. at 134. 
49. Thus, Henry Keyser’s 1850 treatise on the law relating to LSE transactions would note “[t]hat 
[Barnard’s] Act has utterly failed to effect its object is well known, for it is alike anomalous as notorious 
that a numerous and highly-respectable body of men earn their livelihood by the daily and hourly
violation of the clauses of the statute.” HENRY KEYSER, THE LAW RELATING TO TRANSACTIONS ON 
THE STOCK EXCHANGE 152 (London: Henry Butterworth, 1850). 
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much more limited than those of a court applying English contract law.50 LSE
rules permitted annulment only in cases of fraud or willful misrepresentation.51 
In the view of the authoritative, contemporaneous guide to LSE practices, “the
very notion of attempting to render any bargain void on account of a quibble or
technical omission is altogether repugnant to the feeling of the Stock Exchange,
and is regarded as dishonourable and discreditable in the highest degree.”52 
The LSE also tried to limit opportunities for outside legal actors to intervene 
in its affairs. This desire partly explains rules preventing members from having
significant business or debtor-creditor relationships with non-members. For 
example, members originally could not be incorporated bodies and could form 
partnerships only with other members.53 Although the restriction complicated
efforts to raise capital, it also eliminated a major source of disputes between 
members and non-members, which would otherwise have been resolved in the 
English courts. 
The LSE’s system of private dispute resolution was central to its efforts to 
deter scrutiny by outside legal actors. LSE rules forbade members to sue other
members, or another member’s principal, without consent.54 Instead, disputes
between members were resolved through a system of arbitration or by the CfGP
itself, in cases where no arbitrator could be found or the dispute affected the 
general interests of the LSE.55 The CfGP could suspend or expel any member for 
refusing to comply with its decisions or an arbitration award, violating LSE rules, 
or being “guilty of dishonourable or disgraceful conduct.”56 An aggrieved 
member might defy these rules and seek recourse in the English courts, but the 
threat of expulsion kept most in line.57 
Yet the involvement of non-members kept the LSE from fully privatizing the
process of dispute resolution and enforcement. Although customers could 
voluntarily submit disputes to arbitration or to the CfGP, neither legal
compulsion nor extralegal sanctions could prevent customer lawsuits.58 Indeed,
50. MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, supra note 45, at 104–05 (stating that “[t]he Committee have from 
the first strenuously insisted upon the carrying out of all bargains irrespective of the view the law might 
take.”).
 51. MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 135. 
52. MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, supra note 45, at 105. The sentiment would have been familiar to 
members of other merchant communities, for whom a good reputation meant honoring bargains rather
than raising legalistic objections. Christian R. Burset, Merchant Courts, Arbitration, and the Politics of
Commercial Litigation in the Eighteenth-Century British Empire, 34 LAW & HIST. REV. 615, 620 (2016). 
53. MICHIE, supra note 18, at 97. 
54. MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 134. 
55. Id. at 135. 
56. Id. at 127–28. 
57. MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, supra note 45, at 85. Members also had to apply for readmission 
each year, and expelled members could seek readmission—the prospect of which provided a further
deterrent to filing prohibited lawsuits.
58.  Although English law evolved significantly over the time period of interest here, agreements to
arbitrate, especially those involving future disputes, were often treated as revocable. On this history, see 
generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of Contract Provisions Controlling
Resolution of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 
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English judges frequently presided over customer lawsuits against brokers. A 
disappointed customer also might file a lawsuit against the jobber involved in the 
transaction.59 These are just examples. Litigation could implicate the LSE’s 
interests in many ways.60 
In most such disputes, English law treated the LSE’s written rules, and even 
its informal customs, as binding on non-members.61 However, there were 
exceptions, including for situations in which the transaction was illegal or a court 
deemed the custom unreasonable.62 These exceptions proved fertile ground for 
litigation. Lawsuits involving non-members routinely asked English courts to 
interpret and apply LSE rules, to adjudicate the reasonableness of these rules, 
and in other respects to intrude on LSE business. In part for this reason, LSE 
rules purported to grant the CfGP permission to “intervene in cases where the 
principal of a member shall attempt to enforce by law a claim which is not in 
accordance with the rules, regulations, and usages of the Stock Exchange.”63 
IV
THE LSE’S RELATIONSHIP TO ENGLISH LAW AND COURTS
Like other private legal systems, the LSE’s primary enforcement mechanisms 
were extralegal.64 Yet to focus entirely on extralegal sanctions is to miss much of 
the story. English law both informed and constrained LSE rules and practices.
Moreover, the LSE’s governing committees routinely consulted solicitors and 
deferred to their advice, which was usually conservative. The ongoing 
involvement of lawyers limited the reach of the LSE’s private legal system, 
potentially more than the law would have required.65 
207, 208 (2004). Moreover, even if it had wanted to do so, the LSE could not credibly threaten customers
with extralegal sanctions, such as a bar on future orders placed through the LSE. If nothing else, such a 
rule would have been almost impossible to enforce. 
59. MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 73. Jobbers also might sue another member’s 
principal, although only with the CfGP’s permission. Id. at 72; MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, supra note
45, at 104. 
60. For example, a member who could not fulfill his obligations was declared a defaulter and ceased
to be a member. Although LSE rules did not purport to displace the bankruptcy laws, they established 
an Official Assignee empowered to wind up the defaulter’s estate in cases where all creditors were LSE 
members. Not surprisingly, defaulters occasionally failed to disclose the existence of non-member 
creditors. In a subsequent bankruptcy, these creditors might challenge the Official Assignee’s disposition 
of assets—for example, as a fraudulent transfer. MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, supra note 45, at 144–46. 
61. See MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 73–74 (noting that “on the completion of the 
bargain between broker and jobber . . . there is a good and valid contract between the principal and the
jobber . . . which will be of course interpreted with reference to the customs of the Stock Exchange”). 
62. Under Barnard’s Act, for instance, a broker’s right to indemnity from his principal did not 
extend to purely speculative transactions in which no exchange of securities was contemplated. Id. at 42. 
63. Id. at 134. 
64. Barak D. Richman, Norms and Law: Putting the Horse Before the Cart, 62 DUKE L.J. 739, 759– 
60 (2012). 
65. See Neal, supra note 12, at 300 (noting that the LSE “evolved circumspectly to avoid state
regulation”). 
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A. English Law as a Source of Default Rules and a Constraint on Tailored 
Rules 
Trade associations and similar organizations can support private ordering by 
promulgating and enforcing standardized rules, by providing information about 
breach, and by organizing the community’s response.66 To use an example from 
the time frame relevant here, Jérô me Sgard has documented how the London 
Corn Trade Association used standardized contracts and a system of private
arbitration to create a transnational legal order governing transactions in corn.67 
The LSE played a similar role for securities transactions in London, the 
preeminent global capital market. 
To an extent, its rules were derived from custom that had evolved over many 
years of securities trading. But the choice of rules was also informed by legal 
considerations and the guidance of solicitors. This Subpart provides two
examples of this pattern. The first reveals how the LSE deferred to English law 
as a source of default rules for LSE transactions. The second involves 
deliberation over whether the CfGP should assume a broad power to annul
bargains and to bind non-members by the decision. In both examples, the LSE 
was guided by its solicitors’ advice and stopped short of exercising its full rule-
making powers. 
1. English Law as a Source of Default Rules for LSE Transactions 
The first example—and some of those to follow—requires an understanding 
of how transactions were settled. Although transactions took multiple forms,
which evolved over time, here is a simplified description of transactions in 
registered securities: members would strike an oral bargain for the sale of
securities, recording the basic details on slips of paper but not producing a formal 
written contract. The transaction was consummated later that month during a 
series of settlement days, although settlement could be delayed even longer.68 
Settlement took several days, one of which—the “name” or “ticket” day—was 
devoted to identifying the ultimate buyer and seller of the securities.69 The actual 
transfer of ownership did not happen until later. Registered securities required 
the preparation of a transfer deed, which could take time. LSE rules therefore
allowed ten days after settlement for the delivery of transfer deeds.70 
Settlement had two important consequences. First, it discharged the broker 
and jobber from further liability under their contract. Second, it created a 
contract between the ultimate buyer and seller, each of whom had now been 
identified. Of course, given the extended period between bargain and settlement, 
66. McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 26, at 2435–45 (2000); Jérôme Sgard, The Private Governance
of a Global Market: The London Corn Trade Association, 1885–1914 (May 2019) (unpublished draft 
version), https://extranet.sioe.org/uploads/sioe2019/sgard.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P95-BE8G]. 
67. See generally Sgard, supra note 66. 
68. See generally MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 5–20; MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, 
supra note 45, at 9–26.
 69. MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, supra note 45, at 23. 
70. Id. at 26. 
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it was always possible that some event would affect the value of the securities. 
LSE rules determined who bore the risk of such events. Disputes under the first 
contract, between members, would be resolved in its private legal system.
Disputes under the second contract might wind up in court, but English law 
deemed LSE rules binding on non-members except in unusual cases.71 
The first example, from 1927, involved uncertainty over how LSE rules
applied to transactions in so-called Renunciation Letters. These letters were used
to transfer a seller’s right to receive securities that had not yet been issued. After
receiving the seller’s executed Renunciation Letter, the buyer would deliver the 
letter to the issuer of the securities, which would record the new owner. In cases 
where the seller had only partly paid for its allotment of shares, the issuer might 
call for the balance due before the new owner was registered. If that happened,
and the seller made the payment, it could seek indemnification. But from
whom—the jobber it had dealt with directly, the broker that had bought the 
shares from the jobber, or the broker’s client, the ultimate buyer of the shares? 
In a transaction observing the usual form, the answer was clear. After 
settlement, the obligation fell on the ultimate buyer. The reason, again, was that 
settlement discharged the broker from liability and created a contract between 
the ultimate buyer and seller. However, in a typical transaction, the ultimate
buyer’s identity was revealed on ticket day.72 Transactions involving
Renunciation Letters departed from this model, in that brokers did not provide 
a ticket identifying the ultimate buyer. Did this mean the broker was on the hook
to the seller?73 
A dispute between two member firms involving this question arose in July 
1927. Brodie James & Co. sold an allotment of shares to Denny Bros., a firm of 
brokers acting for multiple buyers. The issuer made a call on Brodie James’s 
client, the ultimate seller, for the balance due on the shares. Thereafter, Brodie
James sought confirmation that Denny Bros. would indemnify its client for this 
expense.74 Having gotten no response, Brodie James asked the CfGP to decide
the question.
There appears to have been neither a written rule on the question nor a
relevant custom. Rather than announce a rule to fill the gap, the CfGP requested 
a written opinion from a solicitor, Harold G. Brown, of Linklaters & Paines.75 
Brown opined that, in the absence of an LSE rule or custom, transactions of this 
71. Subject to some uncertainty discussed infra at note 159, LSE rules and customs were binding if 
reasonable or known to the customer. See MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, supra note 45, at 42 (noting that 
the court in Reynolds v. Smith held that LSE Rule 94 was not unreasonable and thus binding).
72. The buyer’s identity could prove important. The seller could not object to a reasonable buyer 
but could cancel the transaction in some cases—if, say, the ticket named a buyer who lacked capacity to
contract. 
73. Recall that under the law of agency, the broker could likely demand that his principal reimburse 
the expense. 
74. See Guildhall Library, MS 14612/6/16 (Aug. 3, 1927). The binder containing these meeting 
minutes is marked with both a 5 and a 6 on the spine. I use the number 6, which appears on the inside. 
75. See THE LAW LIST 411 (London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1908). 
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sort “would be governed by the ordinary law,” under which “each vendor would 
be entitled to an indemnity from his immediate purchaser.”76 The rule implied
that Brodie James should indemnify its own client but could then seek 
reimbursement from Denny Bros., which could, in turn, seek reimbursement 
from its own clients, the ultimate buyers. The dispute settled before the CfGP
made a decision, with Denny Bros. apparently arranging for the issuer of the 
securities to obtain payment from the ultimate buyers directly.77 
The episode is noteworthy, in part, because everyone involved seemingly
accepted without question that English law would govern. This was not 
necessarily so. The primary constraint on the CfGP’s discretion came from the
risk that the ultimate parties, all non-members, would refuse to accept the 
outcome. Assume, for example, that the CfGP issued a ruling that purported to 
immunize Brodie James from any obligation to indemnify its own client. If the 
ultimate seller sued Brodie James anyway, the court might resolve the dispute in 
accordance with English law given the lack of an applicable LSE rule or custom. 
In this sense, English law was clearly relevant to the CfGP’s inquiry. Yet the law 
was not dispositive. For instance, nothing prevented the CfGP from deciding that
the brokers should indemnify the ultimate seller whatever English law might 
have to say on the subject.78 But there is no indication that the CfGP ever 
considered resolving the dispute except in accordance with English law— 
although of course the settlement meant there was no final decision. 
The dispute between members did prompt the CfGP to ask the Sub-
Committee on Rules and Regulations to consider whether to amend LSE rules.
After considering the solicitor’s letter and little else, the Sub-Committee 
recommended no change.79 The result left a gap in the rules, presumably to be 
filled by English law. 
2. English Law as a Constraint on Tailored Rules 
The preceding example illustrates how English law supplied default rules for 
some LSE transactions. This is, of course, an important function of state-created 
law. Parties may defer to state-created law because it matches their preferences 
or because they find it prohibitively costly to draft better rules.80 So perhaps it is 
to be expected that the LSE borrowed default rules from English law. Yet even
76.  Guildhall Library, MS 14612/6/15 (Aug. 3, 1927). 
77. The letters notifying the CfGP of the settlement bear the same date as the solicitor’s letter,
although it is not clear whether Brown’s opinion influenced the settlement or was even known to the 
member firms. The letters from the member firms do not reference Brown’s letter and give the
impression that Denny Bros. had been working for some time to resolve the matter. Guildhall Library,
MS 14612/6/16–17 (Aug. 8, 1927). 
78.  The brokers would have complied with the decision or risked expulsion, and could in any event
seek reimbursement from their own clients. 
79.  Guildhall Library, MS 14612/7/6–7 (July 11, 1933). 
80. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory
of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (“Ideally, the preformulated rules supplied by 
the state should mimic the agreements contracting parties would reach were they costlessly to bargain 
out each detail of the transaction.”). 
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when the LSE seriously considered adopting rules tailored to its own needs,
English law could be a constraint. A second example illustrates the point. 
In this example, the Council of the LSE (the Council), the CfGP’s successor, 
considered expanding its power to annul bargains.81 Interest in the change was 
prompted by public controversy about trading in Italian sovereign bonds and 
related debt in the wake of the end of the Second World War. In April 1947, the 
Italian government agreed on the outline of a plan to resume payments on prewar 
debt due to Britain.82 Implementation of the agreement was delayed, and 
negotiations continued into early 1948.83 The settlement terms were officially
revealed on January 29, 1948, but a leak of information appears to have prompted 
significant trading on the day before the announcement.84 Many LSE members 
believed trades had been based on inside information and demanded an 
investigation.
The Council acted quickly, announcing the following day that it had canceled
a number of bargains with the consent of all parties. Although it asserted that no
LSE member had known the terms of the settlement, the Council apparently was 
not satisfied that “the clients concerned were innocent of prior knowledge.”85 At
the time, Rule 74 allowed the Council to annul bargains only “upon a specific 
allegation of fraud or willful misrepresentation or upon prima facie evidence of 
such material mistake in the bargain as in their judgement renders the case one 
which is fitting for their adjudication.”86 Contemporaneous press reports noted
that the rule did not allow annulment of bargains in which one party traded on
inside or confidential information.87 If an English court shared that 
understanding, non-members could have sued to enforce transactions annulled 
over their objection. For that reason, the Council limited its intervention to cases 
in which all parties agreed to cancel the transaction. 
The episode prompted the LSE to consider rule revisions to expand the 
power to annul bargains and to make clear that annulment bound non-members.
As usual, the question was delegated to the Sub-Committee on Rules and 
Disputes, the successor to the Sub-Committee on Rules and Regulations. One 
proposal was to grant the LSE sweeping power to annul bargains, without any 
substantive standard to guide the decision. As revised, the rule would have 
provided: “The Council may annul any bargain if, after making such enquiries as 
81. The Council was the LSE’s governing body after the merger of the Committee for General 
Purposes and the Committee of Trustees and Managers. See MICHIE, supra note 18, at 297. 
82. Italian Debt Service, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 1948, at 198. 
83. Id. 
84. Suspected Leakage of Italian Debt News, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 30, 1948, Edition 18, 332, 
column 3, at 1. 
85. Italian Bond Dealings: Some Bargains Canceled, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 1948, Edition 
18, 335, column 2, at 4.
 86. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 43 (A.L.F. Green ed., 1938). 
87. Italian Bond Dealings: Some Bargains Canceled, supra note 85, column 2, at 4.
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they think fit, they are satisfied that the circumstances in which the bargain was 
made were such as in their judgment would justify its annulment.”88 
A competing proposal more directly targeted dealing in confidential 
information: “The Council may in their absolute discretion annul a bargain either 
on the ground of material mistake or if in their opinion there is evidence of fraud 
or improper use of information which should have been regarded as confidential 
or secret.”89 
The Sub-Committee repeatedly sought guidance from solicitors on these 
proposals, including on whether it was possible to bind non-members.90 One early 
meeting was attended by Sam W. Brown, of Linklaters & Paines. Brown asserted 
that it would “be a pity” to alter LSE rules recognizing the “sanctity of bargains,”
but he had also submitted a letter advising that the LSE had ample freedom of 
action.91 The letter recounted a meeting with another solicitor, W. Gordon
Brown, with whom Sam Brown had discussed the matter. With regard to the first 
option—giving the LSE nearly unfettered annulment authority—the letter 
expressed the practical concern that the change might prompt “a possible flood 
of applications for annulment.”92 But whichever path the LSE took, the letter left
no doubt that non-members would be bound by the rule: “[P]urchases or sales of 
securities by members of the public, through the medium of the Stock Exchange, 
are subject to the Rules and Regulations of the Stock Exchange.”93 
Minutes from this early meeting of the Sub-Committee reveal debate about 
the wisdom of a rule change. The matter was considered important enough that
the Sub-Committee requested a formal opinion letter from W. Gordon Brown.94 
This letter, ultimately signed by W. Gordon Brown and Cyril Radcliffe, provided 
starkly different advice. The solicitors advised that, under English law, an LSE 
rule or custom bound non-members only if it (i) was intended to have this effect 
and (ii) was either reasonable or known to the customer at the time of the 
transaction.95 In their view, Rule 74 as written was not intended to bind non-
members and therefore gave the LSE no power whatsoever to annul bargains in 
a way that affected a non-member’s rights.96 Moreover, they advised that even if 
Rule 74 were revised to expressly bind non-members, “the case would fall within 
the principle of ‘unreasonable’ customs in markets, since so wide a power to
88.  Guildhall Library, MS 14612/9/36 (Mar. 17, 1948). 
89. Id.
90. Other questions included whether the proposals risked expanding the potential grounds for libel 
or slander lawsuits against the LSE. 
91.  Guildhall Library, MS 14612/9/37 (Mar. 17, 1948). 
92. Id. at 36. 
93. Id. The only qualification expressed was that the annulment would have to occur before the 
bargain “was completed,” that is, before a contract came into existence between the ultimate buyer and 
seller.
 94. Id. at 37–38. 
95.  Guildhall Library, MS 14612/9/40-41 (Aug. 29, 1947). The question was in some doubt after the
1903 decision in Benjamin v. Barnett. See infra notes 160–78. 
96.  Guildhall Library, MS 14612/9/41 (June 2, 1948). 
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annul contracts otherwise than on legal grounds would, in [their] opinion, be 
unreasonable.”97 In consequence, an amended rule—here, the solicitors did not 
distinguish between the two proposals—would bind only those non-members 
who knew of the rule at the time of the transaction. 
W. Gordon Brown and Cyril Radcliffe were extremely prominent solicitors 
and perhaps accustomed to having clients defer to their opinions.98 But it is
notable that they dismissed both proposed revisions as “unreasonable” without 
any further explanation and without referring to a single English legal authority 
that supported this view.99 The omission cannot readily be attributed to legal 
custom in the writing of opinion letters. Other parts of the letter include extensive 
references to English case law, yet the authors apparently felt no need to offer 
such authority to justify the core of their advice. I am in no position to dispute
their intuition, and I have found no cases that squarely address the topic. 
However, English law did permit contracting parties to specify grounds for 
termination of the contract.100 It is true that the situations the law had confronted
bore little resemblance to what the LSE had in mind.101 And perhaps English
courts would have been deeply skeptical of the first proposal, which gave the 
CfGP unfettered discretion to annul bargains. But the second proposed 
amendment only modestly expanded the LSE’s annulment authority to include 
cases in which a party made “improper use” of confidential information.102 
Nevertheless, the letter seems to have satisfied the Sub-Committee, which 
recommended no change to LSE rules. The Council adopted the 
recommendation. The uproar over the Italian debt settlement had faded, and 
perhaps this tempered the push to expand the LSE’s annulment powers. But the 
episode illustrates another way in which English law constrained the reach of the 
LSE’s private legal system. More particularly, it reveals two noteworthy
tendencies in LSE’s reliance on lawyers. First, the LSE deferred greatly to its 
solicitors’ advice about whether a rule change might provoke conflict with the 
English courts. Second, the solicitors gave quite conservative advice, in which the
desire to avoid legal scrutiny effectively trumped the desire to maximize the 
LSE’s power to make and enforce rules. As we will see, these tendencies recur 
throughout the period covered by this Article.
97. Id.
98. Most famously, or infamously, Radcliffe was responsible for the map partitioning India and
Pakistan.
99.  Guildhall Library, MS 14612/9/41 (June 2, 1948). 
100. See, e.g., SIR WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT AND OF 
AGENCY IN ITS RELATION TO CONTRACT 411–22 (16th ed. 1923). 
101.  Anson’s tome discusses, among other things, force majeure and similar clauses. See id.
102. There were other reasons, perhaps sufficient in their own right, to reject the proposed 
amendment. For example, as the solicitors noted, the proposal would have necessitated changes to a 
number of other rules. It might also have created greater risk of litigation alleging libel or slander. 
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B. Managing the Relationship with English Courts 
Thus far, we have seen that English law operated both as a set of default rules 
and as a constraint on the LSE’s ability to adopt tailored rules. Of course, the 
LSE retained a great deal of freedom to adopt specialized rules, especially to
govern members, for whom the threat of exclusion encouraged compliance. But 
English law and courts also constrained the use of extralegal sanctions. The 
constraint was magnified by the LSE’s general reluctance to have English courts 
interpret its rules or rule on the legality of disciplinary decisions. At times, this 
reluctance led the CfGP to let significant rule violations go unpunished.
1. Punishing Members for Filing Prohibited Lawsuits: Judicial Scrutiny as a
Check on Extralegal Sanctions 
In one notable episode in 1915–1916, a member, Halfhead, filed a lawsuit 
seeking the appointment of a receiver to wind up his partnership with another 
member. The lawsuit violated the spirit if not the letter of at least two rules. Rule
71 required “all disputes between Members” to be arbitrated or resolved by the
CfGP, and Rule 72 forbade members to “attempt to enforce by law against 
another Member a claim arising out of a Stock Exchange transaction . . . . ”103 
These rules were at the core of the LSE’s private legal system, and it took
violations seriously. Nevertheless, after being instructed by the CfGP to 
immediately discontinue his lawsuit, Halfhead cheekily replied that “he regretted
that he must go on.”104 Continued disobedience prompted the CfGP to suspend 
Halfhead indefinitely, but it held this decision in abeyance after receiving a 
threatening letter from Halfhead’s lawyer. Instead, the CfGP referred the matter 
to its solicitors.105 
The solicitors recommended against suspending Halfhead.106 In their view, 
Rule 72’s prohibition on lawsuits “arising out of a Stock Exchange transaction”
applied only to disputes over “some specific bargain made on the Stock Exchange 
. . . . ”107 Moreover, Rule 71 could not possibly mean what it appeared to say: 
“[A]ll disputes between members” must clearly receive some limitation; private 
quarrels which have nothing to do with the Stock Exchange cannot be included, or the
rule would be ultra vires the Committee. In our opinion, the Rule only applies to 
disputes between members arising out of Stock Exchange transactions, and does not
extend the jurisdiction of the Committee any further than Rule 72.108 
The interpretation is plausible but not especially compelling. We may 
concede that English courts would not enforce an arbitration requirement for 
103. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 30–31 (Edward Satterthwaite ed., 
1911). 
104. Guildhall Library, MS 14600/98/41–42 (Oct. 11, 1915). 
105. See generally Guildhall Library, MS 14600/98/41–201 (Oct. 11–Dec. 13, 1915). 
106.  Guildhall Library, MS 14612/3/86–88 (Jan. 27–Feb. 3, 1916). 
107. Id. at 86. 
108. Id. at 87. An earlier draft of the letter appears at Guildhall Library, MS 14600/98/263–64 (Jan. 
3, 1916). 
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disputes having “nothing to do with the Stock Exchange.”109 This dispute,
however, was between two LSE members and concerned the winding up of a
partnership that existed to buy and sell securities on the Exchange.110 Certainly
the text of Rule 71 encompassed such disputes. And even if that rule was read
narrowly to encompass only disputes arising “out of a Stock Exchange 
transaction,” this dispute plausibly satisfied that standard. The partners’ 
disagreement concerned how to respond to widespread defaults by partnership
clients on transactions that did not settle due to a halt in trading prompted by the 
onset of the First World War. The partnership was left holding the securities, and
the partners disputed whether to sell the securities or to keep them in the hope 
of a rise in price.111 It is hardly a stretch to argue that such a dispute arises out of 
Stock Exchange transactions. 
The point is not that the lawyers were wrong; they may well have been right. 
Certainly two senior English solicitors were better able to predict the outcome of
litigation than a U.S.-trained lawyer writing a century after the fact. The episode 
is another example, however, of how the LSE sought to avoid going to court to 
defend its interpretation of the rules or its imposition of extralegal sanctions.
Although the initial resolution suspending Halfhead had passed unanimously,112 
the CfGP reversed course, with nineteen of the twenty-six members present 
voting not to confirm the resolution.113 Rather than push the issue against 
Halfhead, the CfGP revised the rules to ensure that future partnership disputes 
were subject to the arbitration requirement.114 Thus, the LSE avoided litigation
and strengthened its private dispute resolution system, although at the cost of 
tolerating a member’s significant rule violation and very public defiance of its 
authority.115 
2. Litigation Involving Non-Members: Defending the LSE’s Reputation and 
Right to Self-Governance 
Some disputes could not be kept out of the courts. The problem, as always, 
concerned litigation involving non-members. Much of the LSE’s work consisted
of monitoring and responding to these developments. Perhaps the most 
109. English law traditionally viewed arbitration agreements with skepticism, although this tendency 
waned over the course of the nineteenth century. See infra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
110. LSE rules required that all partners be members of the LSE. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
THE STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 103, at 24–25. 
111.  Guildhall Library, MS 14600/98/199–200 (Dec. 13, 1915). 
112.  Guildhall Library, MS 14600/98/190 (Dec. 8, 1915). 
113.  Guildhall Library, MS 14600/98/264 (Jan. 3, 1916). 
114. The revision drafted by the Sub-Committee, which the CfGP ultimately approved, consolidated 
Rules 71 and 72 into one rule and expanded the arbitration requirement to include “[a]ll disputes . . . 
connected with Stock Exchange business and including partnership disputes.” Guildhall Library, MS
14612/3/55–62 (Apr. 22–June 9, 1913) & 86–99 (Jan. 17, 1916). 
115. In an 1894 memorandum, the Secretary of the CfGP described how the LSE’s rules concerning 
the expulsion of members had evolved. A copy of the memorandum is included in the minutes of the
Nov. 7, 1894 meeting of the Sub-Committee on Rules and Regulations. See Guildhall Library, MS 
14612/2/4–6. 
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important aspect of this work involved defending the principle that LSE rules 
bound non-members, at least when the rule was reasonable or known to the non-
member at the time of the transaction.116 This was a well-established rule of law,
but English judges occasionally made comments that seemed to call the rule into
doubt or to undermine the credibility of the LSE.
The case of Tomkins v. Saffery117 is an example.118 A member, Cooke, could
not fulfill his Exchange obligations and was declared a defaulter. Although its 
rules did not purport to displace the bankruptcy laws,119 the LSE established an 
Official Assignee empowered to wind up the defaulter’s estate in cases where all
creditors were LSE members. After Cooke represented that he had no creditors 
outside the LSE, the Official Assignees accepted a transfer of the bulk of Cooke’s 
assets, consisting of five thousand pounds, and distributed them among Cooke’s 
LSE creditors.120 In fact, Cooke’s father-in-law, who was not a member, was a
creditor and filed a petition in bankruptcy against Cooke.121 
The bankruptcy trustee sought to recover the five thousand pounds from the 
Official Assignees. Although the bankruptcy judge refused to grant this relief,
the Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that Cooke’s transfer of the funds was 
a voluntary surrender—cessio bonorum—of his estate and thus in itself an act of
bankruptcy. The court therefore required the Official Assignees to return the
money and to pay the costs of the appeal.122 The legal reasoning underlying the
judgment did not necessarily imply criticism of the LSE. Nevertheless, the LSE 
was deeply concerned by certain aspects of the judgment, delivered by Lord
Justice James. In the reporter’s account, the Lord Justice characterized Cooke’s
transfer of funds, and the Official Assignees’ acceptance of the money, as “a plain
and palpable fraud on the bankruptcy laws—a plain and palpable fraud upon the
creditors.”123 His description of the Official Assignees’ argument was especially
unflattering:
An insolvent on the eve of bankruptcy takes some of his creditors’ money to provide
himself with a comfortable resting place after his bankruptcy, and the body of his Stock
Exchange creditors say to him: “Cheat your other creditors for our benefit, and we will 
re-admit you as a proper and worthy member of our fraternity.” If anything were
wanting, this supplies it. It shows how improper and utterly illegal the whole of the
transaction was.124 
116. See MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, supra note 45, at 34 (discussing the relationship between 
brokers and their principals); Id. at 118 (discussing the contract formed between the ultimate buyer and
seller).
117.  Tomkins v. Saffery [1877] 3 HL 138 (appeal taken from App. Ct. in Bankruptcy).
 118. NATHANIEL C. MOAK, REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE ENGLISH COURTS 161 (24th ed. 
1880). 
119. On the evolution of which, see Jérôme Sgard, Courts at Work: Bankruptcy Statutes, Majority
Rule, and Contracting in England (17th–18th Century), J. OF COMPARATIVE ECON., at 3–4 (forthcoming).
 120. MOAK, supra note 118, at 140. 
121. Id. 
122. Ex parte Saffery–In re Cooke (1876) 4 Ch. D 555 at 555 (Eng.). 
123. THE ACCOUNTANT 9 (5th ed. 1879). 
124. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW REPORTS 2157 (143rd ed. 1979). 
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The Lord Justice concluded: “[T]he Stock Exchange is not an Alsatia; the 
Queen’s laws are paramount there, and the Queen’s writ runs even into the 
sacred precincts of Capel-court.”125 
The LSE funded an appeal to the House of Lords. The goal was not to change
the outcome, which would have been “hopeless.”126 The Court of Appeals had
gotten it right; LSE rules could not alter the distribution a non-member was 
entitled to receive in a debtor’s bankruptcy. Lord Justice James’s remarks,
however, “were considered to contain an aspersion upon the whole body and its 
customs,” and the appeal sought to correct these seemingly “grave
misapprehensions” about the LSE and its practices.127 
On that score, the appeal was a resounding success. The House of Lords 
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, but each of the Law Lords took
pains to portray the LSE and its rules in complimentary terms.128 The LSE’s 
procedures for allocating a defaulter’s assets were “very wise and expedient,”129 
and there was “nothing in the case which impeaches the integrity, in purpose or 
in action, of the Stock Exchange.”130 The case was watched closely by the press,
which likewise interpreted the decision by the House of Lords to have “fully
exonerated the Committee of the Stock Exchange from the imputation that their 
rules were framed with the view of securing a fraudulent preference in favour of 
members of their own body as against the general creditors of a defaulting 
member.”131 Indeed, Lord Justice James later expressed surprise “to hear it had
been supposed that he had meant to make injurious reflections upon the conduct 
of the Stock Exchange.”132 
3. Responding to Misinterpretation of LSE Rules and Other Legal Shocks
As discussed earlier, many LSE rules were intended to bind non-members 
and had this effect so long as reasonable or known to the non-member.133 For
example, in determining whether a broker acted within the scope of his authority, 
courts would interpret a customer’s order in light of LSE custom.134 Of course,
this assumed the judge could identify the relevant rule and interpret it as the LSE 
had intended, and this could not be guaranteed. A judge might also interpret 
English law in unexpected ways, with disruptive consequences for LSE practices.
125. Saffery, 4 Ch D at 561. 
126. MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, supra note 45, at 105. 
127. Id.
128.  Tomkins v. Saffery [1877] 3 HL 138 (appeal taken from App. Ct. in Bankruptcy).
 129. Id. at 161 (Lord Gordon). 
130. Id. at 152 (Lord Blackburn). 
131. Law Report: Tomkins and Another v. Saffery, THE TIMES, Nov. 16, 1877, at 10. 
132. Law Report: Supreme Court of Judicature: Tomkins v. Saffery, THE TIMES, Nov. 23, 1877, at 11. 
133. See supra Part IV.B.2.
 134. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Newhall (1846) 153 Eng. Rep. 867, 867 (interpreting customer’s order for 
“shares” in a corporation to allow broker to purchase an allotment of to-be-issued shares).
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One example, from 1871, implicated LSE rules governing deeds of transfer, 
which were used for transactions in registered securities.135 A common problem 
involved allocating liabilities resulting from delay. The seller could not prepare 
the deed until it learned the buyer’s identity, which was supplied by ticket during
settlement. If the seller did not receive this ticket within the period set by the 
rules, it could resell the securities and seek compensation for any loss. Likewise, 
a buyer who did not receive the securities within the allowed window after 
settlement could cover by purchasing the securities elsewhere, seeking 
compensation for any increase in price.136 Tickets often passed through the hands 
of many intermediate buyers and sellers, making it hard to allocate responsibility 
for delay. Consider a scenario in which a buyer did not receive the securities in 
time, covered, and sought compensation for the difference between the cover 
price and the contract price. Which party in the chain of ticket-holders was 
responsible? LSE’s complex rules on the subject included both technical 
requirements—for example, record-keeping obligations—and soft standards— 
for example, allowing the ultimate seller to escape liability if an LSE member 
caused “undue delay.”137 
These and other LSE rules constituted a set of standardized terms created to
govern contracts between members and, to the extent possible, transactions 
involving non-members. LSE rules effectively determined the parties’ rights and 
obligations even if not expressly incorporated into the contract. With respect to
contracts between members, LSE rules were not mere gap-fillers; they were 
mandatory terms imposed as a matter of course in the LSE’s private dispute 
resolution system.138 With respect to contracts between brokers (as agents) and 
customers (as principals), English courts presumed that customers intended for 
orders to be carried out in accordance with the usual practice on the LSE.139 As
for the contract that eventually resulted between the ultimate buyer and seller— 
neither an LSE member—courts likewise treated the parties as if they had 
implicitly agreed to be bound by LSE rules.140 To be sure, few if any of these
contracts expressly referenced or incorporated the rules. Nor were most
transactions documented through standard-form contracts promulgated by the 
135. Upon receipt of the deed from the seller, the buyer would sign and deliver it to the registrar of 
the shares, which could then record the new owner’s identity. 
136. For background on these and other problems in transactions in registered securities, see
generally MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 58–59, 93–99. 
137. Id. at 59. Lawsuits could implicate these rules. For example, consider a suit by an LSE member 
who had paid compensation to the buyer, seeking reimbursement from the original owner of the shares— 
in LSE-parlance, the ultimate seller.
 138. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 103, at 30 (stating that 
bargains between members “must be fulfilled according to the Rules, Regulations and usages of The
Stock Exchange”). 
139. MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, supra note 45, at 34. The conclusion of a bargain between broker
and jobber created a contract between the jobber and the broker’s principal, which was likewise
interpreted in accordance with LSE Rules. Id. at 106–07. 
140. Id. at 118. 
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LSE itself.141 As noted, most bargains between members were oral. But given the 
LSE’s sway over its members and the general tendency of English courts to defer 
to its rules, there was little need for such formalities.142 
In some contexts, a court’s misinterpretation of standardized contract 
language can have enduring negative consequences. In theory, the 
misinterpretation need not affect future transactions, for the form’s drafter can 
revise the relevant clause to clarify its meaning. In practice, inertia often prevails.
Parties may continue to use the same formulation of a clause long after legal
developments have made that formulation problematic.143 Put differently,
standardized forms offer benefits but can also be “sticky.” 
Trade associations and other organized merchant groups can help produce 
and maintain the integrity of standardized contracts.144 The LSE proved adept at 
such work. In July 1871, the Sub-Committee on Rules and Regulations noted that 
recent decisions by English courts had highlighted “certain ambiguities” in the 
rules governing securities delivered by deed of transfer.145 The Sub-Committee
prepared, and the CfGP approved, revisions “so as to render [the rules] more
clear in arrangement, and more precise in expression.”146 Work of this nature was 
a routine part of Exchange governance. The meeting minutes of the CfGP and 
the Sub-Committee on Rules and Regulations reveal nearly constant 
consideration of rule changes, often in response to developments in the English 
courts and frequently based on extensive advice from solicitors. 
A second example, from 1917, involved a disruptive legal event that wreaked 
havoc on the LSE’s method for administering defaulters’ estates. The event was 
an unexpected interpretation of English law in the case of In re Halstead.147 As
noted, LSE rules empowered an Official Assignee to collect and distribute a
defaulter’s assets when there were no creditors outside the LSE. If a member 
became the subject of bankruptcy proceedings, however, the bankruptcy
invalidated any transfer of assets to the Official Assignee—at least when the
transfer occurred within three months of the bankruptcy.148 (As in Tomkins v. 
141. There were some exceptions. For instance, the LSE created a standard-form submission
agreement for cases in which a non-member voluntarily submitted to the LSE’s private dispute resolution 
system. 
142. Conceivably, English courts might have relaxed the rule that non-members were bound only by
“reasonable” LSE rules if the LSE had insisted that members and their customers use written contracts
that expressly referenced the rules. As noted infra at note 159, however, English law generally presumed
that customers knew the rules, and the LSE’s solicitors advised that only reasonable rules would be
enforced against non-members. 
143. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION:
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 9–12 (2013). 
144. See Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1075 (2006); Sgard, supra note 66. 
145.  Guildhall Library, MS 14600/35/225 (July 18, 1871) 
146. Id.
 147. In re Halstead–Ex Parte Richardson (1916) 22 TLR 718, 718 (Eng.). 
148.  For background, see generally International Law, 52 CAN. L.J. 329, 340–41 (1916). 
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Saffery, the assets belonged to the bankruptcy estate for distribution in
accordance with English law.149) 
This was all viewed as settled law. In the Halstead case, a bankruptcy judge 
unexpectedly ruled that, because of recently-enacted legislation, LSE procedures 
for administering defaulters’ estates had to comply with the statute governing
deeds of arrangement. These instruments memorialized a debtor’s voluntary
assignment of assets to creditors outside of bankruptcy, and the statute required
that the deed be registered.150 This was entirely contrary to LSE practice, which
treated the administration of defaulters’ estates as a matter of purely internal 
concern. 
The LSE’s solicitors interpreted the Halstead ruling to forbid the Official 
Assignee to administer estates, and to block the CfGP from resolving related 
disputes, until a deed of arrangement had been prepared and registered in 
accordance with the statute.151 The CfGP funded an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed the bankruptcy judge’s ruling.152 There followed 
extensive deliberations over whether to continue the appeal to the House of 
Lords or to revise LSE rules to bring them in compliance with the statute 
governing deeds of arrangement. As its solicitors noted, the latter course raised 
numerous difficult questions—such as whether and how to make rule changes
retroactive to “the cases of defaults and liquidations which have taken place” 
since the legislation amending the deed of arrangements statute.153 Despite these 
difficulties, the CfGP elected to bring LSE rules into compliance with the 
statute.154 
4. Constraints on the Ability to Respond to Unexpected Developments in the 
English Courts 
The Halstead case was an extreme example of how developments in the 
English courts could disrupt practices on the LSE. In a more common scenario,
a judge would adopt an unexpected interpretation of LSE rules. As we have seen, 
one response was for the LSE to revise its rules to clarify the meaning. The LSE 
made such amendments frequently, but they were not costless. The amendment 
process consumed committee time, might require money for solicitors, and could 
be blocked by internal divisions among members. Moreover, the LSE shied away 
149. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
150. Before it was amended, the statute applied only to compositions between the debtor and all 
creditors. See International Law, supra note 148, at 341. As a technical matter, the statute might have
applied to proceedings before the Official Assignee. But even if so, it did not matter when all creditors
were LSE members; English courts did not hear these cases. 
151. See Guildhall Library, MS 14612/3/164–67 (May 10, 1917); MS 14612/3/196–200 (Aug. 23, 1917). 
152. See Guildhall Library, MS 14600/101/101–02 (Feb. 5, 1917). 
153.  Guildhall Library, MS 14600/101/102 (Feb. 5, 1917). 
154. See generally Guildhall Library, MS 14600/101. 
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from rule changes that might invite judicial scrutiny, as illustrated by the 
abandoned effort to expand the CfGP’s annulment authority.155 
Another response to a problematic judicial decision was for the CfGP to fund
an appeal. We have seen that the LSE sometimes did this to great effect—for 
example, in Tomkins v. Saffery.156 But appeal was no panacea. The separation
between owners and members, paired with the owners’ control over the purse 
strings, limited the funds available for appeal. There was also a broader, 
structural limit on the utility of the appellate process. The likelihood of a 
successful appeal is partly a function of choices made during trial, and the CfGP
did not control these choices. The LSE itself was not a party to lawsuits affecting
its interests.157 At times, the CfGP did not even know about relevant litigation 
until after the trial court’s ruling. By then, it might be too late.
Consider the 1903 case of Benjamin v. Barnett.158 The case would prove 
problematic for decades. For instance, it arguably created a separate legal test for 
determining whether a non-member was bound by LSE custom, as opposed to a 
written rule.159 But the most immediate problem was not that the case introduced
doctrinal uncertainty. The problem was that the judge had misapplied LSE rules 
and called into question their ability to bind members and non-members alike.160 
The underlying transaction involved the purchase of seventy shares in the
Transvaal Exploration Company. Benjamin, a broker, agreed to buy the shares 
from a firm of jobbers on the instructions of his non-member customer,
Barnett.161 The company initially refused to certify fifty of the shares, causing a
delay in delivery.162 Thus, Benjamin attempted to deliver only twenty shares, and 
even these he tendered to Barnett after the time period contemplated by LSE 
155. See Guildhall Library, MS 14612/7/21, (Sep. 14, 1933) (noting that it would be “difficult to make 
a rule which superceded the authority of the Courts”). 
156. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
157. The rules purported to give the CfGP power to intervene in lawsuits, but no one thought this
gave the CfGP the right to become a party. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
158.  Benjamin v. Barnett (1903) 19 TLR 564, 564 (KB). 
159. Expressed in modern terms, the distinction seems to have been that non-members 
presumptively had knowledge of written rules. Therefore, the rules were binding, whether reasonable or
not. But the presumption was reversed for informal customs. Without proof of a member’s actual 
knowledge, the court would enforce the custom only if reasonable. As late as 1948, the LSE’s solicitors
were disputing that the law in fact recognized this distinction. See Guildhall Library MS 14612/9/40 (June 
2, 1948) (stating that even though many cases of the Court of Appeal did not refer to a “distinction 
between a rule and a custom” this did not “justify the distinction drawn by Kennedy J in” Benjamin v.
Barnett). 
160. See Benjamin, 19 TLR at 565 (stating that the rule in question “was not binding on the
defendant” or even the plaintiff). 
161. Id. at 564. 
162. Id.  The certificate affirmed that the transferor was in fact registered as the owner of the shares.
See MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 45, at 98. 
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rules.163 Barnett refused to accept any of the shares.164 Subsequently, the CfGP
ordered Benjamin to pay for the remaining fifty shares when delivered by the 
jobbers.165 Benjamin did as instructed and sued Barnett to recover his costs.166 
The court found Barnett liable for the twenty shares but ruled that he had no
obligation to indemnify Benjamin for the remaining fifty.167 This was so 
notwithstanding the fact that the CfGP had required Benjamin—on pain of 
expulsion from the LSE168—to honor his contract with the jobbers.169 In the view 
of Justice Kennedy, the presiding judge, the remaining fifty shares had been
tendered beyond the period allowed by LSE rules.170 Justice Kennedy “did not 
see how, by passing a resolution, the [CfGP] could make valid a contract which
had been broken.”171 In his view, the CfGP had no power to pass a resolution
binding Barnett and, indeed, did not even have the power to bind Benjamin, the 
member.172 
Benjamin petitioned the CfGP for funds to pursue an appeal, arguing that the 
effect of Justice Kennedy’s ruling “was greatly to impair the indemnity which it 
had always been considered a Broker had, in respect of dealings for a client.”173 
The CfGP was concerned enough to ask the owners for funds to cover the appeal, 
and it referred the matter to the Sub-Committee on Rules and Regulations to 
consider whether to make clarifying rule changes.174 The Sub-Committee replied
that no change was necessary, but the seven to two vote reflected intense 
disagreement. According to the dissenting members: 
[C]onsidering the fundamental importance of the principle involved in Mr. Justice 
Kennedy’s Judgment in Benjamin v. Barnett, against which the Committee is
supporting the plaintiff’s appeal, and considering the danger to the general interests of
the House of allowing that principle to remain even temporarily in doubt, it is desirable 
that without waiting the result of its Appeal, a Rule should be passed as speedily as 
possible explicitly stating the principle in question.175 
As it often did, the CfGP sought legal advice. The reply from the solicitor, 
Rufas D. Isaacs, ended any debate about the merit of supporting an appeal. 
163.  It was not clear that the rules authorized the buyer to cancel the transaction. Instead, they gave 
the seller ten days from settlement to deliver the shares and, if this did not happen, authorized the buyer
“buy in” and demand compensation for any loss. MELSHEIMER & GARDNER, supra note 45, at 189. 
Barnett had not exercised the right to buy in. 
164. Benjamin, 19 TLR at 564. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 565. 
168. MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 127–28 (the CfGP could expel any member for 
not obeying its order). 
169. Benjamin, 19 TLR at 564. 
170. Id. at 565. 
171. Id.
 172. Id. The report of the case indicates that Justice Kennedy believed Benjamin had voluntarily
assumed the obligation to pay for the remaining fifty shares during the hearing before the CfGP. 
173.  Guildhall Library, MS 14600/74/316. 
174.  Guildhall Library, MS 14600/74/317. 
175.  Guildhall Library, MS 14612/2/129 (July 7, 1903). 
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According to Isaacs, an appeal had “no reasonable prospect” of success, largely 
because Benjamin had failed during trial to introduce any evidence of a relevant
LSE custom.176 To be sure, there was “no doubt an argument to be based upon 
the Rules and Regulations, but it is wholly unsatisfactory in the absence of
evidence as to practice or custom.”177 And, although Justice Kennedy’s 
disparaging comments about the CfGP’s authority were unfortunate, Isaacs 
dismissed these as unnecessary to the resolution of the case. After reviewing the 
letter, the CfGP withdrew its request for funds to pursue the appeal, deciding 
that it would be “better to wait until a case arose where the custom had been fully 
proved in evidence . . . . ”178 
5. The Proposed Ban on Non-Member Claims Not Recognized by the LSE
Thus, although the LSE could and did protect its interests when implicated
by litigation, it could not guarantee that English judges would correctly apply 
LSE rules. And although it frequently amended the rules, there remained a
broader risk, emphasized by Justice Kennedy’s comment in Benjamin v. Barnett, 
that the CfGP could not “make valid a contract which had been broken.”179 The
risk was that English courts might allow non-members to assert rights that the
LSE did not recognize. 
On at least one occasion, in 1933, the LSE consulted its solicitors to see if this 
risk could be eliminated. Recall that LSE rules allowed the CfGP to “intervene
in cases where the principal of a member shall attempt to enforce by law a claim
which is not in accordance with the rules, regulations, and usages of the Stock 
Exchange.”180 The meaning of this rule—at the time, Rule 76—was not clear. The
word “intervene” implied the right to participate as a litigant in the non-
member’s lawsuit, but it was understood that LSE rules could not create such a 
right out of thin air.181 The Sub-Committee on Rules and Regulations asked the
solicitor to clarify the meaning of this rule. It also sought advice on several 
potential revisions, the most important of which would have forbidden non-
members to “enforce at law a claim against a member which is not enforceable
under the Rules.”182 
On the first question, the solicitor confirmed that the CfGP could not formally 
intervene in a non-member’s lawsuit. At most, it could “support and contribute 
to the cost of the defence of a Stock Exchange defendant.”183 This interpretation
highlighted the structural problem, noted earlier, that kept the LSE from
176.  Guildhall Library, MS 14600/74/437-39 (Sept. 14, 1903). 
177. Id. at 438. 
178. Id. at 14600/74/439 (Sept. 14, 1903). 
179. Benjamin, 19 TLR at 565. 
180. See MELSHEIMER & LAURENCE, supra note 8, at 134. 
181. Id. at 73 (“If an action is brought by the principal against the jobber, the Committee would
certainly have no locus standi to intervene in a technical sense. . .”). 
182.  Guildhall Library, MS 14612/7/7 (July 13, 1933). 
183. Id. Although he did not see “a great deal of virtue in the Rule,” the solicitor advised retaining
it, to avoid giving the impression that the LSE had conceded the point. Id.
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effectively protecting its interests in litigation.184 Because it could not make itself 
a party, and in any event often learned about lawsuits too late, the CfGP could 
not control what happened during the most important phase of any lawsuit that
proceeded to judgment: the trial.185 
The solicitor’s advice on the proposed revision was more complicated. He
conceded that, under English law, non-members were bound by written rules and
that this principle would apply equally to a rule that limited non-members to
claims recognized by the LSE.186 Nevertheless, he predicted that English courts 
would not enforce such a limitation:
[I]f you alter Rule 76 so as to provide that a non-member shall not attempt to enforce 
at law a claim against a member which is not enforceable under the Rules, this will be
binding on a non-member plaintiff and enable a Stock Exchange defendant to get a stay 
of any proceedings instituted in contravention of the Rule. This however amounts to
ousting the jurisdiction of the Courts and would meet with such zealous opposition from
that quarter that I am sure they would find some excuse for saying the Rule was not
187 
The solicitor seems to have based this opinion on the so-called ouster 
doctrine. For much of the nineteenth century, English law allowed contract 
parties to revoke their assent to arbitrate future disputes. This rule was often
attributed—though without much evidence—to judicial hostility to agreements 
that ousted the courts of jurisdiction.188 By 1933, however, it is not clear that the 
law justified such a definitive rejection of the proposed amendment to Rule 76. 
In 1889, the English Arbitration Act made most arbitration agreements 
irrevocable, although English courts retained authority to review questions of law 
raised in arbitration.189 English courts had also become more willing to enforce
clauses requiring parties to litigate in other jurisdictions or calling for the
application of other law.190 These developments were most relevant to parties 
184. See supra Part IV.B.4.
185. I do not know why the CfGP did not consider requiring members to inform it of any lawsuit. 
Frequently it did receive notice early in the case, so perhaps it thought such a rule unnecessary. Even
after Benjamin v. Barnett, however, I found no evidence indicating that the CfGP considered this option. 
186. Guildhall Library, MS 14612/7/7 (July 13, 1933). This was so, in the solicitor’s view, because non-
members were bound by written rules (though not informal customs) whether or not the rule was 
“reasonable.” On the confusion about this question, introduced by Benjamin v. Barnett, see supra note 
159. 
187.  Guildhall Library, MS 14612/7/7 (July 13, 1933). 
188. On this history, see generally Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern
Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J. L. ECON & ORG. 479, 
483 (1995) (stating that “contracts to arbitrate were declared revocable because they ‘oust courts of their
jurisdiction’”); Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 603 (1928) 
(noting that many say “the courts took an unfriendly view toward arbitration, inasmuch as they upheld
the revocability of submission”). See also David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 444–45 (2011) (identifying eighteenth century England as the origin of “unique anti-arbitration
measures”); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2855–56 (2014) (discussing how, in 19th century, 
parties to arbitration agreements “could not turn to the public system to enforce that obligation.”). 
189. Sayre, supra note 188, at 607.
 190. See Ingrid M. Farquharson, Choice of Forum Clauses – A Brief Survey of Anglo-American Law, 
8 INT’L L. 83, 88–93 (1974) (discussing English law concerning choice of forum agreements); Hessel E. 
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involved in international transactions, but they provided the basis for an 
argument that buyers and sellers of securities were entitled to resolve disputes in 
the forum of their choice and in accordance with their preferred rules. 
There are echoes here of the Halfhead episode, where the LSE opted not to 
discipline a member who broke the prohibition on suing other members.191 
Again, the point is not that the solicitor provided the wrong advice. It is that the
solicitor provided conservative advice, which was grounded in intuition rather 
than identifiable legal authority—the courts would find some excuse to treat the 
rule as non-binding—and which assumed the LSE would rather avoid conflict 
with English courts than flex its rule-making muscle. Given the LSE’s general 
reluctance to invite judicial scrutiny, it is perhaps no surprise that the Sub-
Committee readily deferred to the solicitor’s views. Although in the process of 
making sweeping revisions to the rules, it left Rule 76 alone.192 
V 
CONCLUSION
Like other private legal systems, the LSE enforced transactions in accordance
with specialized rules and through a system of extralegal sanctions. Yet self-
governance also required the LSE to manage recurring frictions with state legal 
actors. In addition to the ever-present threat of Parliamentary legislation, English 
courts routinely heard disputes implicating the rules and customs of the LSE, and 
these decisions could impair the LSE’s ability to make and enforce its preferred 
rules. Any group that aspires to self-governance must devote some of its 
resources to managing such risks. For the LSE, the work was substantial and
often heavily shaped by legal considerations. 
LSE rules did not simply codify merchant customs. English law was both a 
source of default rules and a constraint on the ability to adopt tailored rules. 
Having established the rules, the LSE’s governing committees worked to
maintain their integrity. Although it could not prevent non-members from filing 
lawsuits implicating its interests, the LSE actively managed the risks such 
litigation created. It routinely revised its rules to add clarity or to correct a judicial 
misinterpretation, and it proved itself capable of using the litigation process to its 
advantage, as in Tomkins v. Saffery. In all of these activities, the LSE’s governing 
committees relied heavily on legal advice. 
It is tempting to think that the LSE’s freedom of action was constrained
primarily by mandatory rules of English law—such as the rules governing the 
distribution of a debtor’s assets in bankruptcy. And indeed, formal legal rules of
Yntema, “Autonomy” in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 348–49 (1952) (discussing English law 
concerning governing law clauses). 
191. See supra Part IV.B.1.
 192. See Guildhall Library, MS 14612/7/20–23 (Sept. 14, 1933). The CfGP meeting minutes include
extensive discussion of the Sub-Committee report but reveal no indication that Committee members
questioned this aspect of the Sub-Committee’s decision. See Guildhall Library, MS 14600/129/163–211 
(Sept. 18–Oct. 16, 1933). 
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this nature were significant constraints. But it would be a mistake to overlook the
more subtle, yet still substantial, constraint that resulted from the relationship
between the LSE and its solicitors. For the most part, the LSE sought to avoid
legal scrutiny, even to the point of tolerating significant rule violations, as in the
Halfhead episode. Perhaps aware of this tendency, the LSE’s solicitors tended to
give conservative advice that prioritized avoiding legal conflict over maximizing
the reach of the LSE’s private legal system. In this indirect way, state-created law
and legal institutions—and the norms they foster in lawyers—both supported and
constrained the LSE’s private ordering activities.
